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NOTES

Non-Refoulement: The Search for
a Consistent Interpretation of
Article 33
ABSTRACT

The international community rose to the challenge of
addressing mass migration with the 1951 Convention Relating
The 1951
to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention).
Convention established several important concepts as binding
international law, including the requirements for refugee
classification and the principle of non-refoulement. The duty of
non-refoulement prohibits state-parties from expelling or
returninga refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion. According to the
definition in Article 33, non-refoulement is applicable only
where there is an affirmative classificationof refugee status as
articulated in Article 1. The 1951 Convention and its 1967
Protocol are currently the guiding instruments on refugee law,
and the 1951 Convention provides a minimum foundation for
the rights of refugees.
Even though the 1951 Convention clearly outlines nonrefoulement as an obligation of the 133 state signatories, the
international debate focuses on the correct interpretation and
scope of the principle in practice. A restrictive reading of Article
33 suggests that non-refoulement has narrow applicationto only
those refugees who have already entered the territory of a
receiving state. Opponents to the restrictive reading of Article
33, however, maintain the duty of non-refoulement is limited
only by the affirmative classificationof refugee status-the 1951
Convention imposes no other restrictions or requirements for
persons seeking asylum.
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States have adopted a
variety of positions for
implementation, which fall on a continuum based on their
interpretation of non-refoulement. In addition, states have
formulated legal mechanisms that coincide with their beliefs as
to the extent of domestic obligations under Article 33. Because
of these varied interpretations, the implementation of nonrefoulement is inconsistent among states and the destiny of
many refugees depends upon whether they reach the border of a
state that interpretsArticle 33 more favorably than its neighbor.
This Note argues for the necessity of a consistent international
approach to the implementation of non-refoulement and
analyzes the differing interpretations of Article 33 through
judicial decisions to determine the state's legal, rather than
political,position on the duty of non-refoulement.
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A CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OFAR TICLE 33
I. INTRODUCTION

1946: the International Refugee Organization (IRO), operating
under the United Nations, assisted 1.6 million refugees in resettling
and reintegrating into their European communities after the
conclusion of World War II, not including those who fled Europe
completely.1 1987: a staggering 13 million refugees were concentrated
solely in Africa and Asia.2 2005-2006: the world experienced a global
increase of 56 percent from 21 million to 32.9 million persons of
3
interest to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
2006: of the recoverable data, 3.5 million refugees are under the age of
4
eighteen.
As globalization increases, problems that often faded into the
backdrop of domestic policy now require international attention.
Suddenly, the challenges facing one state become the challenges
facing many, and the rest of the world feels even the smallest
developments. In the context of refugees, issues surrounding the
movement of people across borders necessitate collective action in
response to massive amounts of people displaced by the most horrific
conflicts and conditions in modern history. 5 The era of stagnant
domestic solutions has ended.
The international community rose to the challenge of addressing
mass migration with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (1951 Convention). 6 The 1951 Convention established
several important concepts as binding international law, including
the requirements for refugee classification and the principle of nonrefoulement. 7
Non-refoulement prohibits states from returning
refugees to territories where their life or freedom would be

1.
1996).
2.

GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (2d ed.
Ved P. Nanda, Refugee Law and Policy, in REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY:

INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. RESPONSES 3, 5 (1989).

3.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCR], Div. of Operational Serv., Field
Info. & Coordination Support Sec., 2006 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers,
Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons,at 4 (July 16, 2007), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4676a7ld4.pdf.
4.
Id. at 9.
5.
See, e.g., id. at 4 (stating a fifty-six percent increase in the number of
persons of interest in just one year).
6.
See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention] (entered into force April 22, 1954;
attempting to answer issues concerning refugees following World War II).
7.
Id. art. l(A)(2).
[O]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, [a
refugee] is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.
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threatened for one of the reasons listed in the 1951 Convention.8 The
principle pertains to the refugee's right not to be sent back to his or
her country of origin unless there is a negative determination of
refugee status. 9 Under Article 33, non-refoulement is only applicable
where there is an affirmative classification of refugee status as
defined by Article 1.10
Non-refoulement is articulated in the 1951 Convention as a
binding legal duty imposed on the signatories of the treaty; however,
it is also considered by some scholars to be a foundational principle in
the protection of refugee rights and customary international law. 1'
Domestic courts of various states and scholars have found that nonrefoulement applies not only to the parties that have signed and
ratified the 1951 Convention but also to non-signatories as a norm
established by state practice: 12 "The prohibition on refoulement,
contained in art. 33.1 of the Refugee Convention, is generally thought
to be part of customary international law, the (unwritten) rules of
international law binding on all states, which arise when states
follow certain practices generally and consistently out of a sense of
3
legal obligation."'
The history of the principle of non-refoulement coincides with the
increasing pressure to acknowledge the growing refugee problem in
the twentieth century. The 1933 Refugee Convention marked the
first time a multilateral international treaty contained a non-

8.
Id.
9.
Id. art. 33(1) ("No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion.").
10.
See id. (restricting non-refoulement to refugees, as defined previously in
Article 1, and noting that the threat to the refugee must be on account of the same
factors used in considering whether a person qualifies for refugee status).
11.
See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 143 (arguing that non-refoulement is a
binding norm under customary international law).
12.
See, e.g., Zaoui v. Attorney-General, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 690,
34 (C.A.),
aff'd, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 577 (S.C.) (exerting court's power of judicial review from 1951
Convention application to nonparties, i.e. refugees such as Mr. Zaoui); Revenko v. Sec'y
of State for the Home Dep't, [2001] Q.B. 601, 18 ("[I]t is common ground that Articles
31 and 33 [of the 1951 Convention] sufficiently reflect customary international law.").
See also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 143; Sir Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel
Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement: Opinion, in
REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 87, 149 (Erika Feller, Volker Turk, & Frances Nicholson
eds., 2003) (discussing whether non-refoulement is a principle of customary
international law); cf. Haitian Ctr. for Human Rights v. United States, Case 10.675,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 88 (1997) (holding
that the principle of non-refoulement was part of customary international law).
13.
Zaoui, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 690, 34.
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refoulement provision. 14 The prohibition on refoulement, however,
15
applied only to those refugees received as state-authorized arrivals.
Subsequent to the 1933 Refugee Convention, the United Nations
General
Assembly
established
the United
Nations
High
Commissioner for Refugees (the UNHCR). 16
Through official
resolutions, the UN charged the UNHCR with providing aid to
17
refugees entitled to protection by prior treaties and arrangements.
In addition, the UNHCR's mandate included overseeing "protection
activities"; "for example, [the UNHCR was responsible for] ensuring
that no refugee is returned to a country in which he or she will be in
danger."'

8

Despite state protest, the drafters included the non-refoulement
provision in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, influenced by the
vestiges of World War II, the 1933 Refugee Convention, and the work
of the UNHCR. 19 The 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol are
currently the guiding instruments on refugee law, and the 1951
Convention provides a minimum foundation for the rights of
refugees. 20 Various regional instruments subsequent to the 1951
Convention solidified states' obligations of non-refoulement by
explicitly delineating that a state may not reject a person at the
border if it would force that person to return or remain in a territory
where his life, liberty, or physical integrity would be threatened. 21

14.
Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees art. 3, Oct. 28,
1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 3663 [hereinafter 1933 Refugee Convention]; JAMES C. HATHAWAY,
THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (2005).

15.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 302.
16.
G.A. Res. 428 (V), annex,
1-2, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 14, 1950).
17.
GOODWIN-GILL, supranote 1,at 7.
18.
Id. at 8.
19.
Id. at 119-24; see also HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 279-80 (citing the
example of the German Jews aboard the St. Louis who were refouled by several
countries and thus, returned to Europe where they were exterminated).
20.
Daniel J. Steinbock, The Refugee Definition As Law: Issues of
Interpretation,in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES 13, 13 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick
Twomey eds., 1999). There are many regional instruments that were developed
subsequent to the 1951 Convention, which grant more rights to refugees, but the 1951
Convention still serves as a minimum baseline of rights for refugees. See, e.g., OAU
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10,
1969, OAU Doc. CMI267IRev. 1, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 1288 (1969)
[hereinafter OAU Convention] (outlining specific context where refugees in Africa have
rights); Protocol No. 4 to Amend the European Convention on Human Rights art. 3,
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (extending protection from expulsion and deprivation of
re-entry to national persons); Organization of American States, American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. Doc. OEA/ser. LJVIII. 23 doc. 21, art. 22(7),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 99, 107-08 (1970) ("Every person has the right to seek and be
granted asylum.").
21.
See, e.g., OAU Convention, supra note 20, art. 11(3) ("No person shall be
subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or
explusion, which would compel him to return or remain in a territory where his life,
physical integrity or liberty would be threatened ....").
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These regional instruments, however, bind a small number of states
in comparison to "the 1951 Convention. 22 The principle of nonrefoulement is promulgated in other modern, non-binding
23
instruments as a cornerstone of international refugee law.
While non-refoulement is clearly outlined as an obligation to the
133 signatories of the 1951 Convention, the international debate
focuses on the correct interpretation and scope of the principle in
state practice. 24 Some states advocate an expansive reading of
Article 33 while others insist that the plain text of the 1951
Convention narrows the scope of non-refoulement. 2 5 Part II outlines
the debate regarding the manner in which Article 33 should be
interpreted as well as the methodology developed in this Note, setting
forth the embodiment of different state positions. Part III applies the
methodology and surveys the landscape analyzing various approaches
that state parties have taken to implement non-refoulement. Part IV
proposes suggestions for remedying the lack of uniformity in
complying with the obligation of non-refoulement under Article 33 of
the 1951 Convention. Finally, Part V concludes the Note.

II.

FRAMING THE DEBATE AND ESTABLISHING THE METHODOLOGY

A. Framingthe Debate: Different Sides of the Refugee Issue
The basic theory behind the principle of non-refoulement has
been established within the international community, and the
26
language is crystallized in the 1951 Convention for state parties.
The Convention and its subsequent protocol, however, are not self-

22.
As of 2002, fifty-three countries signed and ratified the OAU Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. List of Countries,
African Union (May 26, 2007), available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/
Documents/Treaties/ListConvention%/ 20on%20Refugees.pdf. In contrast, 133 states
are party to the 1951 Convention. United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Status Information and Text (Feb. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2ref.htm.
23.
See generally San Remo Declarationon the Principle of Non-Refoulement,
in International Institute of Humanitarian Law, International Congress:
Humanitarian Action and State Sovereignty, Aug. 31-Sept. 2, 2000, at 195 (on file with
author) (stating the role of non-refoulement in modern international refugee law).
24.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (articulating the principle of pacta sunt
servada, meaning that as a signatory to the Convention, States are legally obligated to
fulfill the duties distributed by the Convention).
25.
For a discussion of the positions taken by different States, see infra Part
III.
26.
See, e.g., GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 143 (claiming that the principle of
non-refoulement is well established in international law).
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executing instruments 2 7 and lack specific guidelines for the
implementation of non-refoulement. 28 The conceptual gap between
obligation and implementation stems from the precondition that nonrefoulement applies only to persons who are determined to be
refugees under Article 1 of the 1951 Convention. 29 "The [1951]
Convention does not, moreover, require that a contracting state adopt
any particular procedure for determining refugee status. '30 Because
there are no standardized procedures for determining those falling
within the refugee definition, and because non-refoulement protection
is limited to those defined as refugees, states have significant latitude
in deciding which asylum-seekers have access to 1951 Convention
protections. 31 "The [1951] Convention defines a status to which it
attaches consequences, but says nothing about procedures for
identifying those who are to benefit. '32 States are bound only by a
good faith effort to take necessary steps to implement the provisions
of the 1951 Convention. 33
This standard affords states broad
authority to subjectively implement non-refoulement as they deem
appropriate, at the cost of international uniformity. 34
In addition to a lack of standardized application, there is no
uniform interpretation of the scope of obligations encompassed under
Article 33.35 A restrictive reading of Article 33 suggests that nonrefoulement would be limited to those who have already entered the
territory of a receiving state. 36 This reading, proponents argue, is
perfectly consistent with the text of the 1951 Convention, based on
the drafters' choice to use the key words "expel or return. '37 "Expel or

27.
Nanda, supra note 2, at 4-5 ("[E]ven for those states ratifying these
instruments, the responsibility for operationalizing that definition and the provisions
of the Convention and Protocol into domestic law is left to the states. Thus, without
enabling acts incorporating the Convention into the municipal law of states, these
conventions are not effective.").
28.
See generally 1951 Convention, supra note 6, art. 35 (noting that states
agree to give information on their own implementation of the 1951 Convention; no
specific guidelines are included in the Convention).
29.
M38/2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs (2003) 199 A.L.R. 290, 9 (Austl.).
30.

Id.

10.

31.
Nanda, supra note 2, at 9.
32.
Id. at 4-5 (explaining that the 1951 Convention is not self-implementing,
thus "the responsibility for operationalizing [the 1951 Convention] definition and [its]
provisions ... into domestic law is left to the individual states.") (citing GOODWIN-GILL,
supra note 1).
33.
See id.
34.
For a discussion of the issues surrounding broad discretion in
implementation and lack of uniformity, see infra Part IV.
35.
Compare GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 121-22 (describing a restrictive
reading of Article 33), with HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 315 (explaining a more
expansive reading of Article 33).
36.
See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 121-22 (explaining this interpretation
of non-refoulement as the more restrictive reading).
37.
1951 Convention, supra note 6, art. 33.
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return" implies that only refugees within the territory of the receiving
Records from the
state cannot be subject to refoulement. 38
that several
indicate
1951
Conference of the Plenipotentiaries in
Swiss and
the
33,
including
Article
delegates had this conception of
39
of Article
in
light
Furthermore, Article 33, read
Dutch delegations.
32, crystallizes the meaning of "expel or return," because the
language of Article 32 specifically addresses refugees in the territory
40
of a receiving state with regard to expulsion.
Following the restrictive interpretation of Article 33, states have
devised a variety of approaches to keep refugees outside their borders
while declaring that such practices are consistent with their
obligations under the 1951 Convention. 4 1 Refugee law, including
non-refoulement, is derived from the premise that states have no
42
duty under international law to admit refugees at their borders.
State mechanisms, such as visa controls and agreements with other
states to divert the passage of refugees, keep refugees from reaching
state borders and are used to exert control over territorial integrity as
a sovereign right. 43 The next section will outline in detail the various
mechanisms devised by states to avoid assuming responsibility for
refugees, especially in cases of mass migration, and the compatibility
of those mechanisms with legal obligations imposed by the 1951
Convention.

See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 121-22 (stating that the restrictive
38.
reading of Article 33 did not coincide with the European view of immigration law in the
mid-twentieth century).
See U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
39.
Stateless Persons, 16th mtg., UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16 (Nov. 23, 1951), available at
(indicating the Swiss
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3ae68cdc14.html
position on the correct interpretation of Article 33); see also U.N. Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 35th mtg., UN Doc.
1951), available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/
(Dec. 3,
A/CONF.2/SR.35
PROTECTION/3ae68ceb4.html (indicating the Dutch position on the correct
interpretation of Article 33).
See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 206 ("The words 'expel or return' . ..
40.
have no precise meaning in general international law. .-. . [A]lthough article 32
possibly implies that measures of expulsion are reserved for lawfully resident aliens.").
For an explanation of the different schemes devised by States, see infra
41.
Part III.
42.
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 25-28; Nanda, supra note 2, at 9 ("[States]
retain the sole discretion to determine who enters their territory and on what terms.");
see also NAGV & NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and
14 (Austl.) ("First, customary international
Indigenous Affairs (2005) 213 A.L.R. 6,
law deals with the right of asylum as a right of states not individuals; individuals,
including those seeking asylum, may not assert a right under customary international
law to enter the territory of a state of which the individual is not a national.").
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 310-11 (stating that visa controls imposed on
43.
nationals of states tending to produce large numbers of refugees is a classic tool used
by states to reduce the probability of receiving refugee). This tool is commonly referred
to as non-entrde. Id. Article 33 does not invalidate these types of procedures. Id.

2009]

A CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OFAR TICLf 33

Critics of the restrictive reading of Article 33 maintain that the
language contained within the 1951 Convention is limited only by an
affirmative classification of refugee status and imposes no other
restrictions for persons seeking asylum. 44 Critics argue, "[t]he duty of
non-refoulement has ordinarily been understood to constrain not
simply ejection from within a state's territory, but also nonadmittance at its frontiers. '45 This reading is consistent with the
derivation of Article 33 from its predecessor, Article 3 of the 1933
Refugee Convention, which "explicitly codified non-admittance as an
aspect of refoulement. ''46 Records also indicate that the drafters of
the 1951 Convention intended the principle of non-refoulement to
prohibit states from engaging in summary removal and denial of
access. 47 In fact, critics argue the drafters meant the language "expel
or return" to convey a broad proscription against non-admittance and
ejection, rather than a restrictive interpretation of non-refoulement,
48
applying only to those who successfully crossed the border.
B. Establishingthe Methodology: Discerning the Various
Positionson Article 33
This Note seeks to survey the determinations of states around
the world regarding asylum policies and refugee classifications to
discern state conceptions of obligations under Article 33. To provide a

44.
See, e.g., id. at 315 (explaining the position that Article 33 only imposes
limited obligations on States party to the 1951 Convention).
45.
Id. at 315; see also U.N. Exec. Comm. on the Int'l Prot. of Refugees,
Conclusions Adopted by the Executive Committee on the International Protection of
Refugees 1975-2004, No. 6 "Non-Refoulement," at 8,
c (1977), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/41b041534.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2008) (describing
the critical role of non-refoulement within the territory of a state and at the border);
Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supranote 12, at 122.
46.
1933 Refugee Convention, supra note 14, art. 3; HATHAWAY, supra note 14,
at 315.
47.
See U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Ad Hoc
Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems,First Session, 21st mtg., at 5, U.N.
Doc. E/AC.32/SR.21 (Feb. 2, 1950) (documenting the position of the delegates of the
United Kingdom and France that non-refoulement could apply to refugees seeking
admission as well as those in the country).
48.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 316-17; see U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on
Refugees and Stateless Persons, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, Belgium and the United States of America: ProposedText for Article 24 of the
Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc. E/AC.32[L.25 (Feb. 2,
1950) (providing evidence that "expel or return" was intended to have a broad meaning
based on the statement of the Belgian co-sponsor [Mr. Cuvelier] of the text: "The duty
[of non-refoulement] has been expanded to an undertaking 'not to expel or in any way
[return] refugees' [with this article referring to] 'various methods by which refuges
could be expelled, refused admittance or expelled."'); see also U.N. Ad Hoc Committee
on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related
Problems, First Session, 22nd mtg., at 20, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.22 (Feb. 14, 1950)
(recounting the statement of Mr. Cuvelier of Belgium).
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descriptive and analytical account of a state's position, this Note
determines the opinio juris49 of the international community by
examining domestic, regional, and supra-national court decisions of
different actors in the international arena.5 0 Opinio juris-states'
perceptions of their legal duties as signatories to the 1951 Convention
and under subsequent implementing legislation-is best reflected by
judicial decisions. 51 Three main reasons explain why opinio juris is
correctly reflected in court decisions, as opposed to state policy
positions or other political products.
First, because the 1951 Convention lacks a supra-national
enforcement mechanism with de facto power to compel state behavior,
opinio juris is critical to determining state behavior. 52 If the state
believes that it has a genuine obligation of non-refoulement under
international law, compliance with Article 33 will be much more
The debate regarding the scope of
consistent and widespread.
obligations of states under Article 33 leaves the door open for states
to shape how refugee issues will be handled.5 3 With freedom of
interpretation, states will pursue their national interests, even if
those interests conflict with the state's obligations under the 1951
Convention. 54 Therefore, opinio juris translates into what the state
perceives it can do in its national interest while remaining within the
confines of its binding legal obligations under international law.
Second, examining judicial decisions serves as an indicator of
what the state believes it must do as a matter of international legal
obligation deriving from its signature to the 1951 Convention.
Judicial decisions of the courts examined in the following section
constrain the ability of policy-makers to enact legislation concerning

49.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1125 (8th ed. 2004) ("The principle that for
conduct or a practice to become a rule of customary international law, it must be shown
that nations believe that international law (rather than moral obligation) mandates the
conduct or practice.").
50.
For a sampling of the different court decisions used to comprise the opinio
juris of States, see infra Part III.
Advocating this methodology of examining judicial decisions of various
51.
international actors, which leads to a discernable sense of opinio juris in the
international community, supports the case that non-refoulement is solidified in
customary international law. For a discussion of whether non-refoulement is part of
customary international law, see supra Part I.
52.
See 1951 Convention, supra note 6, art. 38 (showing that Article 38 is the
main enforcement mechanism in the Convention). The text of Article 38 follows: "Any
dispute between Parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or application,
which cannot be settled by other means, shall be referred to the International Court of
Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute." Id.
53.
See the discussion supra Part II.A for an outline of the debate regarding
the obligations of states under Article 33.
54.
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Perennial Conflict Between International
Criminal Justice and Realpolitik, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 541, 542 (2006) (arguing that
States are not motivated by values that bind humanity but rather by changing and
finite interests).

20091

A CONSISTENT INTERPRETA TION OFAR TICLE 33

non-refoulement. 55 This is not to suggest that the judicial decisions
56
create, or even best describe, the political policy of the state.
Instead, in judicial decisions the legal obligations of the state are set
57
forth in a way that marks outer boundaries limiting policy-makers.
Furthermore, these outer boundaries are accompanied by thorough
explanations of the reasoning behind the court's conclusion and the
5
effect that conclusion has on compliance with Article 33. 8
Third, the concrete limits articulated by judicial decisions better
indicate the state's belief that it must comply with Article 33 as a
matter of international obligation than any isolated piece of
legislation or policy statement. Legislation and policy statements are
often reactionary and based on the current status of domestic
politics. 59 Legislation is not typically binding on future legislative
acts, unless otherwise specified, and does not necessarily represent
overarching societal norms. 60 Judicial decisions, on the other hand,
more carefully weigh the potential long-term effects of a particular
policy and provide jurisprudential analysis of how that policy
coincides with the legal commitments of the state.6 1 Similarly, the
legal obligations of a state set forth in Article 33 are fixed.6 2 They
tend to be more ideologically stable than the political climate of a
state, and as such, the judicial framework best captures the interplay

55.
See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537-38
(1991) (stating the doctrine of precedent in U.S. courts where a higher court issues an
authoritative ruling on a matter of law, that ruling must be applied in subsequent
cases to similarly situated parties); Fitzleet Estates Ltd. v. Cherry (Inspector of Taxes),
(1977) 1 W.L. 1345, 1346 (H.L.) (U.K.) ("[A]fter a decision of the House of Lords has
been delivered with all appearance of finality ... [i]n the absence of such a change of
circumstances ... it requires more than doubts as to the correctness of such an opinion
to justify departing from it.").
56.
See, e.g., Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, (1993) A.C. 789, 880 (H.L.) (U.K.)
("The judges' function in this area of the law should be to apply the principles which
society, through the democratic process, adopts, not to impose their standards on
society.").
57.
Id.
58.
See Gillhams Solicitors LLP, Legal Meanings, Ratio Decidendi,
http://www.gillhams.com/dictionary/243.cfm (last visited Dec. 23, 2008) (explaining
ratio decidendi as the legal reasoning of a judge in reaching his conclusion, which is
binding on lower courts).
59.
Cf. D. MICHAEL SHAFER, WINNERS AND LOSERS: How SECTORS SHAPE THE
DEVELOPMENTAL PROSPECTS OF STATES 42-45 (1994) (arguing that all actors,

especially leading-sector actors, pressure State actors in an attempt to influence policy
that will reflect their current interests).
60.

See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 277 (Max Knight trans., The

Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 2002) (describing how legal norms [legislation] can be
annulled [repealed] making it inapplicable to future acts at the time of annulment).
61.
Donald E. Childress III, Using Comparative ConstitutionalLaw To Resolve
Domestic Federal Questions, 53 DUKE L.J. 193, 210 (2003) (explaining in the context of
common law systems that judicial decisions allow for great flexibility by looking at the
totality of evidence to render an appropriate decision).
62.
See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 24 (defining the obligations of
States as fixed by a treaty unless the treaty is amended or repealed).
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between what the 1951 Convention mandates and what the state
63
thinks is permissible under international law.
This methodology will be applied in Part III in an attempt to
survey the different positions of states regarding the specific
obligations imposed by Article 33. In addition to the descriptive
survey of state positions, Part III analyzes each position's validity in
terms of the plain reading of Article 33 and its fundamental, yet
controversial, status as part of customary international law.
Ultimately, the opinio juris, derived from judicial decisions in this
Note, leads to Part IV, which attempts to propose durable solutions
for regularizing the interpretation of Article 33 and its application to
refugees.

III.

SURVEYING THE LANDSCAPE: DIFFERENT APPROACHES
STATES HAVE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLE
OF NON-REFOULEMENT

State approaches vary without clear guidelines for the best, or
even sufficient, implementation of non-refoulement in domestic legal
systems. Approaches to implementation fall along a spectrum,
ranging from heavily restrictive border access to loosely restrictive
border access. 64 None of the following states, however, have a
position on either extreme of the spectrum, because settled notions of
international refugee law establish that non-refoulement is an
enforceable legal obligation under the 1951 Convention and that it
does not entitle a person to refugee status or asylum. 65 Instead, the
range of positions on the spectrum indicates disagreement over the
extent of the legal obligation Article 33 articulates.
This Note addresses four distinct state positions that represent
different domestic approaches to implementing non-refoulement. The

63.
The case for the methodology used in this Note is largely based on the
selection of primarily common-law judicial decisions as evidence of the opinion juris of
the international community. With that understanding, however, civil law examples
are also considered to support the accurate analytical approach taken in this Note to
characterize the opinion juris of the international community. For a discussion
involving evidence from a civil law system, see the discussion of the French approach,
infra Part IlI.C.
64.
See Framing the Debate, supra Part II.A (explaining the distinctions
between a restrictive reading and a more liberal reading of Article 33).
65.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 300-01 (noting that non-refoulement does not
entitle a person to refugee status or require a state to accept all refugees at its
borders); Jens Vedsted-Hansen, Non-Admission Policies and the Right To Protection:
Refugees' Choice Versus States' Exclusion?, in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES 269,
274-75 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1999) (suggesting that nonrefoulement is an obligation binding states that are party to the 1951 Convention and
also an obligation stemming from a state's duty to protect basic human rights within
its jurisdiction).
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first position is the approach of absolute state sovereignty and, in
turn, interprets obligations of non-refoulement narrowly in relation to
other approaches. 66 The second position is a collective approach to
non-refoulement. Using this approach, states have developed a series
of mechanisms-usually legal procedure-to retain control over the
final destination of refugees without violating non-refoulement. 67 The
third position, known as the collective approach with a twist, outlines
certain procedural mechanisms that allow states to refuse review of
asylum claims and thus remove applicants from their borders. 68 The
final position, or the restrictive definitional approach, uses the
textual ambiguity of Article 33 to exclude certain classifications of
applicants, though already acknowledged as refugees under Article 1,
from non-refoulement protections. 6 9 Examining each approach, the
states' jurisprudence not only reveals their positions but also their
interests and concerns in devising legal mechanisms that reconcile
the tension between treaty obligations and conflicting state policies.
A. The Absolute State Sovereignty Approach
States following the absolute state sovereignty approach conceive
of their non-refoulement obligation under the 1951 Convention as
applicable only when a person seeking refugee status successfully
makes it to their borders. 70 These states find no obligation in the
1951 Convention requiring parties to facilitate the arrival of refugees
into their territory. 71
By itself, the proposition is relatively
uncontroversial-the 1951 Convention has no language requiring
states to assist refugees in leaving their country of origin and arriving
at the border of a receiving state. 72 States that support this
approach, however, submit that affirmatively preventing potential
refugees from reaching their borders is also consistent with Article 33
obligations. 73 The absolute state sovereignty approach recognizes the
1951 Convention as support for a crucial distinction between
expelling a refugee who has gained access to a state's border, which

66.
For an in depth discussion of this approach, see infra Part III.A.
67.
For an in depth discussion of this approach, see infra Part III.B.
68.
For an in depth discussion of this approach, see infra Part III.C.
69.
For an in depth discussion of this approach, see infra Part III.D.
70.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 310 (pointing to the language of the 1951
Convention as not requiring states to assist refugees in leaving their country of origin).
71.

Id.

72.
Id. at 310 (reaffirming that Article 33 is not concerned with ensuring a
successful escape of refugees from their country of origin) (quoting R (European Roma
Rights Ctr. and 6 Others) v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, (2003) E.W.C.A.
Civ. 666, rev'd on other grounds, (2004) A.C. 55 (H.L.) (appeal taken from E.W.C.A.
Civ.)).
73.
See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council, 509 U.S. 158, 187-88 (1993) (ruling
that Article 33 does not impose a prohibition on states to take measures, which prevent
refugees from reaching their borders).
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Article 33 does not permit, and actively inhibiting a refugee from
74
gaining access to the border, which Article 33 does permit.
States following the absolute sovereignty approach use various
methods to prevent refugees from reaching their borders. One
method is to send national authorities of the receiving state to a
country producing an influx of refugees to implement pre-entry
clearance procedures. 75 Pre-entry clearance procedures allow the
receiving state to forestall the flow of refugees by denying them
access to the receiving state's border before they leave their country
of origin. 76 A British Court of Appeals upheld this approach in
European Roma Rights.77 Tlhe court reasoned that no permissible
construction of Article 33 confers a right on refugees to access the
territory of another country. 78 In fact, the court noted that the 1951
Convention does not address whether states should be obligated to
help refugees escape their country of origin; rather, it addresses only
where refugees must not be sent.7 9 From this foundation, the court
concludes that states have no duty to facilitate the arrival of refugees
and that states are entitled to take active steps to prevent their
arrival.80 The court linked these two concepts by stressing that
Article 33 does not address action that causes a refugee to remain in
his country of origin, and any such action does not constitute
refoulement.81
The U.S. approached non-refoulement in a similar manner by
taking active steps to prevent refugees from reaching its borders.
The U.S. government ordered the Coast Guard to intercept vessels on
the high seas containing Haitians attempting to immigrate to the
United States and return them to Haiti.8 2
Using a similar
methodology as the UK, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian
Ctr. Council ruled the correct textual interpretation of Article 33 did
not prohibit the U.S. Coast Guard from intercepting Haitian refugees

74.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 310.
75.
See EuropeanRoma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 3 (describing
the use of these procedures at the Prague airport to prevent large numbers of ethnic
Romas from reaching the United Kingdom).
76.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 308.
77.
EuropeanRoma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 3.
78.
Id. 37.
79.
Id. 37.
80.
Id. 43.
81.
Id. 31.
For good measure article 33 forbids "refoulement" to "frontiers" and, whatever
precise meaning given to the term, it cannot comprehend action which causes
someone to remain on the same side of the frontier as they began; nor indeed
could such a person be said to have been returned to any frontier.
Id.
82.
See Sale v. Haitian Ctr. Council, 509 U.S. 158, 158 (1993) ("President has
directed the Coast Guard to intercept vessels.").
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before they reached the border.8 3 The Court began by noting that
based on a plain textual reading, Article 33 cannot apply
extraterritorially given the parallel use of the terms "expel or return,"
the interplay between Article 33(1) and Article 33(2), and the
negotiating history of the 1951 Convention.8 4 The Supreme Court
held "because the text of Article 33 cannot reasonably be read to say
anything at all about a nation's actions towards aliens outside its own
territory, it does not prohibit such actions [of preventing asylumseekers from reaching the border] .'85
The reasoning of the British Court of Appeals and the U.S.
Supreme Court seems strikingly similar in principles of statutory
construction and in the effects of the preferred interpretation.8 6 Both
courts began with the proposition that no reasonable reading of
Article 33 would support extraterritorial application. 87 Next, the
courts determined that Article 33's lack of specific language
extending its scope beyond refugees already within the state's
territory renders it incapable reaching action taken towards people
outside the state's territory. 88 In essence, under the British and
American approaches, the language of Article 33 effectively places a
geographic limitation on the application of non-refoulement.8 9 The
UK and U.S. reach the same pivotal conclusion: states have the right
under non-refoulement to take positive action to prevent refugees'
access to their borders. 90

83.
Compare European Roma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 7 49-50,
with Sale, 509 U.S. at 187.
84.
Sale, 509 U.S. at 179-83, 186-87; cf. HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 339
(arguing that states have a duty to respect non-refoulement rights wherever a state
exercises effective or de facto jurisdiction outside its own territory; thus, there is not a
specific geographic limitation on Article 33).
85.
Sale, 509 U.S. at 183; cf. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 124 ("Certain
factual elements may be necessary . . .before the principle [of non-refoulement] is
triggered, but the concept now encompasses both non-return and non-rejection [of the
asylum-seeker at the border].").
86.
European Roma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, T 31; Sale, 509 U.S.
at 183.
87.
European Roma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 37; Sale, 509 U.S.
at 182.
88.
European Roma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 31; Sale, 509 U.S.
at 183.
89.
Cf. Haitian Ctr. for Human Rights v. U.S., Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Report No. 51/96, OEAISer.LIV/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 157 (1997) ('The Commission shares
the view advanced by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in its amicus curiae
brief in its argument before the Supreme Court, that Article 33 had no geographic
limitations.").
90.
See European Roma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 7 30-31
(holding that the screening procedures at Prague airport were not a violation of Article
33); see also Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88 (holding that the interception of Haitian refugees
on the high seas and returning them to Haiti was not a violation of Article 33).
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Despite nearly identical reasoning, the British Court of Appeals
distinguished the European Roma Rights case from Sale.9 1 In fact,
the British court regarded Sale as wrongly decided because it used an
outdated approach. 92 The Court of Appeals stated that "preventing
an aspiring asylum seeker from gaining access from his own country
to its territory and on the other hand returning such a person to his
own country . . . is a crucial distinction. '93 The British Court of
Appeals, however, seems to overstate the distinction between these
two cases. While UK procedures stop the refugee in his country of
origin, rather than the high seas, the UK procedures had the same
effect as the U.S.-ensuring refugees did not gain access to the
border. 94 The UK simply saved the trouble of returning the asylumseekers to the Czech Republic by intercepting them before they left. 9 5
The British court's distinction is not legally sustainable; in both
cases, the state took affirmative action to secure its borders from
refugees by using state procedures to ensure asylum-seekers could
not access the border. 96 The methods-interception on the high seas
and interception in the country of origin-are indistinguishable in
terms of implications for the principle of non-refoulement.
Equally unfounded is the distinction between access denial
procedures, such as that of the UK and the U.S., and visa

91.
EuropeanRoma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 43.
92.
Id.
34 ("1 propose to regard the Sale case as wrongly decided; it certainly
offends one's sense of fairness."). Instead, the court referenced Justice Blackmun's
dissenting opinion as the approach consistent with the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights decision and thus, the approach to be followed. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 190
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The terms [of Article 33] are unambiguous. Vulnerable refugees shall not be
returned. The language is clear, and the command is straightforward; that
should be the end of the inquiry . . . Article 33.1 is clear not only in what it
says, but also in what it does not say: It does not include any geographical
limitation. It limits only where a refugee may be sent "to," not where he may be
sent from. This is not surprising, given that the aim of the provision is to
protect refugees against persecution.
Id.; see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 143 (arguing that the majority opinion in
Sale was not based on proper analysis of United States obligations under international
law, but rather an attempt to confer domestic legal principles on the practice of
returning refugees to their country of origin).
93.
EuropeanRoma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 43.
94.
Compare EuropeanRoma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, with Sale,
509 U.S. at 187 (both cases resulting in the active prevention of refugees from reaching
the receiving state's border).
95.
See generally European Roma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, $1 2-3
(noting that the pre-entry screening clearance took place in Prague, prohibiting
refugees from leaving the Czech Republic if their destination was the United Kingdom).
96.
Id. $ 6; Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88.
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requirements. 97 This distinction maintains that visa controls are a
passive mechanism with no need for the state to actively establish its
presence outside its own territory. 98 The British Court of Appeals
addressed the possibility that visa controls could, in fact, be more
harmful to asylum-seekers due to a lack of selectivity and routine
scrutiny. 99 The terms "active" and "passive" are misnomers; the visa
process is an affirmative procedure just as the pre-entry clearance
procedure is an affirmative procedure used to secure the border. 10 0
The claim that visa procedures constitute passive legal mechanisms
because states use them without intent to deny potential refugees
border access is controversial and insignificant in the nonrefoulement analysis. 1 1 In either case, the state knowingly assumes
the risk that its actions prevent potential refugees from reaching the
Furthermore, suggesting that visa procedures are
border.
inconsistent with Article 33 would be contrary to an appropriate
reading of the 1951 Convention and customary international lawthere is little debate that states have the sovereign right to control
0 2
immigration and secure their borders.'
Although British and American courts have upheld the use of
affirmative procedures to prevent refugees' access to the state's
border as consistent with non-refoulement, critics argue that such
procedures, while not prohibited under a literal reading of Article 33,
10 3
are inconsistent with the general intent of the 1951 Convention.
The British Court of Appeals responded to this argument by pointing
out that many other refugees can take advantage of non-refoulement
besides those asylum-seekers prevented from accessing the receiving
state's border; thus, Article 33 is not nullified in light of affirmative
procedures denying border access.' 0 4 In addition, the court noted that
its critics' argument leads to the conclusion that states cannot control
immigration by inhibiting refugees from reaching their shores, which
either precludes the application of the definition of "refugee" as a
limiting factor or places obligations on the state that were not part of
05
the 1951 Convention.

97.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 310 n.163 (arguing that visa requirements
are not de facto contrary to Article 33; yet, visas may have the effect of refoulement due
to their inability to distinguish between persons at risk of persecution and others).
Id. at 311.
98.
49-50;
99.
European Roma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666,
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 312.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 311-12.
100.
101.
See, e.g., id. at 310 n.163 (claiming that visa requirements are not issued
with the intent to prevent refugees from leaving their country of origin.).
EuropeanRoma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, $ 49-50.
102.
103.
Id. 47.
Id.
104.
105.
Id. 47.

296

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL, 42:279

The argument that denying border access is contrary to the 1951
Convention drafters' intent is unpersuasive for other powerful
reasons. If the language of Article 33 placed an obligation on states
not to expel refugees from their territory and prohibited states from
preventing refugees' access to their territory, then the approaches the
U.S. and the UK took would constitute a clear violation of the nonrefoulement duty.10 6 Article 33, however, contains neither any
language illustrating this effect nor any language that clearly
demonstrates the drafters' intent to prohibit states from denying
refugees border access. 107 Instead, Article 33 places a much more
limited obligation on states-not to expel refugees from within their
108
territory.
Related to the "intent of the drafters" argument, some critics
maintain that the good faith principle of treaty interpretation should
prevent states from denying refugees access to their territory as a
part of their legal obligations agreed to as part of the 1951
The good faith principle-to be bound by the
Convention.10 9
provisions of the treaty and perform obligations in good faithgoverns legal obligations created through treaties. 110 The good faith
principle, though, cannot be relied upon as the source of a legal
obligation but can only dictate the way in which states perform treaty
duties, freely and voluntarily agreed."' Cast in such a way, the
principle would incorrectly impose more duties on states than the
limited obligations to which they consented through the treaty.
Opponents' portrayal of the absolute sovereignty approach as
unsympathetic to the plight of refugees betrays a superficial
understanding of the approach. First and foremost, both the UK and
U.S. noted in their decisions the severe consequences when a refugee
is unable to reach the receiving state's border and that states face
difficult decisions in balancing those consequences with other

106.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 315 (stating the initial purpose of nonrefoulement was to prevent countries with summary removal laws or denial of access
laws from relying on those laws to undermine the general restrictions on the expulsion
of refugees); see also Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 12, at 106-07 (pointing out
the humanitarian nature of the 1951 Convention).
EuropeanRoma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, T 43; Sale v. Haitian
107.
Ctr. Council, 509 U.S. 158, 183 (1993).
108.
EuropeanRoma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 43.
109.
See Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 275, 297
(June 30); EuropeanRoma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 43.
110.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 24, art. 26 (containing the good faith
principle); Cameroon Boundary, 1998 I.C.J. at 297 ("[TI]he principle of good faith is a
well-established principle of international law. It is set forth in Article 2, paragraph 2,
of the Charter of the United Nations; it is also embodied in Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969.").
111.
Cameroon Boundary, 1998 I.C.J. at 297.
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domestic effects related to immigration. 112 Yet, states that subscribe
to this approach are not inherently opposed to proscribing affirmative
action preventing refugees from reaching the border.1 1 3 Rather, they
interpret denying refugees border access as consistent with the duty
of non-refoulement because they find no explicit or implied contrary
intent in the 1951 Convention. 1 14 To these states, the issue presented
here is a matter of treaty interpretation rather than proper policy
regarding refugees.1 15 This argument provides an ideal example of
the intersection between the legal force of a treaty and the normative
overlay driving the treaty. Strong normative principles drive the
1951 Convention; however, only those principles the treaty embodies
1 16
can provide the source of binding legal obligations on states.

112.
See European Roma Rights Ctr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 43 ("None of
this [the current scheme of visa requirement and liability], I readily acknowledge, is
entirely satisfactory. In an ideal world there would no doubt be provision for states to
facilitate the escape of persecuted minorities by allowing entry into their own
country."); see also Sale, 509 U.S. at 187-88 (holding that deciding whether the
President's chosen method of migration control poses a greater risk of harm to the
Haitians is not the province of the Court; rather, the Court will only pass upon whether
the President had the authority to take such action, which he did).
113.
Haitian Ctr. for Hum. Rts. v. U.S., Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 51/96, OEAISer.LJV/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 76 (1997).
It should be noted in this regard that no state party to the Refugee Convention,
including the last session of the Executive Committee of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, which was held after the Supreme Court rendered
its decision that the non-refoulement obligation of art 33 does not apply with
respect to Haitians interdicted on the high seas, has lodged any objection with
respect to the United States' interpretation of its treaty obligation as applied to
the case at hand. No other country in the region appears to take the view that
it is bound to let Haitian refugees into its country.

Id.
114.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted in its decision
that while it was not the appropriate body to decide whether the United States was
complying with its obligations under the 1951 Convention in the Sale case, no stateparty, including the UNHCR, issued an official complaint regarding the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Article 33. Haitian Ctr. for Hum. Rts. v. U.S., Case 10.675,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.LV/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 76 (1997). But see
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 338 (arguing that the 1951 Convention explicitly states a
broader conception of non-refoulement obligations by an amendment to include the
phrase "in any manner whatsoever" in Article 33).
115.
See European Roma Rights Cr., (2003) E.W.C.A. Civ. 666, 46 ("It would
therefore be wrong to depart from the demands of language and context by invoking
the humanitarian objectives of the Convention without appreciating the limits which
the Convention itself places on the achievement of them.") (quoting A v. Minister for
Immigr. and Ethnic Aff. (1997) 190 C.L.R. 225, 248 (Austl.)); see also Sale, 509 U.S. at
187 ("While we must, of course, be guided by the high purpose of [the treaty] . ..[due to
our textual interpretation] we are not persuaded that . . . [it limits] the President's
authority to repatriate aliens interdicted beyond the territorial seas of the United
States.").
116.
Sale, 509 U.S. at 183.
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B. The Collective Approach to Non-Refoulement
The collective approach to non-refoulement involves an intricate
series of mechanisms used by states, ensconced by multilateral and
bilateral agreements, to relocate refugees from one state to
another. 117 The refugee redistribution follows two main procedures:
118
the "first country of arrival" rule and the "safe third country" rule.
The first country of arrival mechanism, best exemplified by the
European Union through the Dublin Convention, requires the first
member state at whose border the applicant presents himself to be
responsible for reviewing the asylum claim and granting or refusing
asylum. 119 The safe third country rule allows states to send an
applicant to another member country through which the applicant
has passed so long as that country will review the applicant's asylum
claim. 120 These agreements permit states to redistribute refugees to
other "safe countries of asylum" in order to better allocate the
121
responsibility of providing asylum.
Proponents support the legality of the collective approach to nonrefoulement by arguing that while Article 33 prohibits states from
expelling refugees to a territory where their life or freedom would be
threatened, non-refoulement does not impose an affirmative
obligation to admit refugees into the receiving state's territory. 122

The drafters of the Convention and the parties ... may not have contemplated
that any nation would gather fleeing refugees and return them to the one
country they had desperately sought to escape; such actions may even violate
the spirit of Article 33; but a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated
extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it through no more than its
general humanitarian intent.

Id.
117.
For a discussion of first country of arrival and safe third country rules, see
infra Part III.B.
118.
See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Kathleen Newland, Forced Migration and
InternationalLaw, in MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 123, 126 (2003)
(explaining how refugees can be diverted to countries other than the one in which they
presently reside).
119.
Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications
for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities art. 8,
June 15, 1990, 1997 O.J. (C 254) 1 [hereinafter Dublin Convention] (entered into force
Sept. 1, 1997); see also Nazar6 Albuquerque Abell, Safe Country Provisions in Canada
and in the European Union:A CriticalAssessment, 31 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 569, 57172 (1997) (describing the first country of asylum rule in the broader scheme of safe
country of asylum policies).
120.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 312.
121.
See Goodwin-Gill & Newland, supra note 118, at 126 (stating that burdensharing is an effect of the introduction of safe third country rules).
122.
See S115/OOA v. Minister for Immigr. & Multicultural Aff., (2001) 180
A.L.R. 561, 6 (Austl.) ("[Art. 33] imposes obligations falling short of creating a right
in a refugee to seek asylum, or a duty on the part of Australia (as a Contracting State)
to grant it.").
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Since no obligation to grant asylum exists, receiving states
subscribing to the collective approach send refugees to third states as
long as the third state does not expel the applicant to a fourth state
This
that would endanger the applicant's life or freedom. 123
approach, however, is subject to substantial variation regarding the
extent to which a receiving state is responsible for ensuring a third
not provide
state does not expel the applicant to a territory that does
124
the protections guaranteed under the 1951 Convention.
Canadian case law supports state involvement in multilateral
agreements with other countries under the safe third country rule as
Canada's Immigration Act,
consistent with Article 33.125
implementing non-refoulement in the Canadian domestic legal
system, allows a refusal to review an applicant's asylum claim if
coming from a receiving state that has agreed to share the
responsibility of examining asylum applications. 126 The Canadian
Court of Appeals points out that according to the Immigration Act,
safe third country agreements can only be made with "countries that
comply with Art. 33 of the [1951] Convention."'1 2 7 In fact, the
Canadian Supreme Court held that Canada shares responsibility for
any breach, even if Canada's involvement is indirect, when Canada
sends an applicant to a safe third country that then violates Article
33.12s Thus, Canada seeks to minimize the risks inherent to safe
asylum country schemes by statutorily requiring that other countries
involved in the scheme are signatories to the 1951 Convention and
implement Article 33 domestically.
On the other hand, some countries utilize the safe third country
rule without any requirement that the third state comply with the
1951 Convention. Australia, for example, does not require the safe
third country be party to the 1951 Convention. 129 Instead, Australian

See M38/2002 v. Minister for Immigr. & Multicultural & Indigenous Aff.,
123.
39 (Austl.) ("[Art. 33] is an obligation not to expel from its
(2003) 199 A.L.R. 290,
territory a person who is determined to be a refugee within Art. 1 to the frontiers of a
territory in which there is a threat to his or her life or freedom for a Convention
reason.").
124.
Compare Thabet v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigr., [1998] 4 F.C. 21
(Can.) (requiring Canada to ensure that a country to which a refugee is sent will not
6 (allowing Australia to
violate Article 33), with S115/00A, (2001) 180 A.L.R. 561,
send a refugee to a country that is not bound by Article 33).
See, e.g., Thabet, 4 F.C. at 9 (affirming Canada's use of agreement to divert
125.
refugees to other countries).
126.
Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. I 2 §§ 46.01(1), 114(1)(s) (1985) (Can.); see
Thabet, 4 F.C. at 9 (explaining the application of § 46.01(1) and § 114(1)(s)).
Thabet, 4 F.C. at 9 (citing § 114(1)(s) of the Immigration Act).
127.
128.
See Suresh v. Can., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (ruling primarily in regards to
breach of a domestic duty but containing analysis helpful for understanding the
international obligation under Article 33); see also HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 335.
See Sll5/OA v. Minister for Immigr. & Multicultural Aft., (2001) 180
129.
A.L.R. 561, 6 (Austl.).
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courts have held that it is consistent with Article 33 to permit the
receiving state's removal of an applicant to a third country if the third
country has accorded the applicant effective protection. 130
One
Australian court articulated the standard for effective protection as
follows: "[S]o long as, as a matter of practical reality and fact, the
applicant is likely to be given effective protection by being permitted
to enter and live in a third country where he will not be under any
'131
risk of being refouled to his original country, that will suffice.
This standard places the onus on the fact-finder to assess the realistic
situation and current practices of the third country and to determine
whether there is a likely chance that the refugee will receive effective
132
protection.

Importantly, in order to find that a third country affords effective protection
such as described above [in accordance with Article 33], it is not necessary to
show that (i) the applicant has already been granted refugee status in that
country (ii) the third country is a party to the Convention . . . or (iii) the
applicant has a right of resident in that country.
Id.; see also HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 328. This position is demonstrated by
Australia's "Pacific Strategy," which allows refugees to be removed from Australia to
States not party to the 1951 Convention. For a detailed discussion regarding the
objectives of the "Pacific Strategy" and its inconsistency with Australia's responsibility
under international refugee law, see Susan Kneebone & Sharon Pickering, Australia,
Indonesia, and the Pacific Plan, in NEW REGIONALISM AND ASYLUM SEEKERS 167, 167-

68 (Susan Kneebone & Felicity Rawlings-Sanaei eds., 2007).
130.
See Minister for Immigr. & Multicultural Aff. v. Thiyagarajah, (2000) 199
C.L.R. 343, 364 (Austl.) ("The decision of the Tribunal could be sustained on the basis
that.., protection obligations under the Convention do not extend to a person who has
established residence and acquired effective protection as a refugee in another
country."); see also Al-Rahal v. Minister for Immigr. & Multicultural Aff., (2001) 110
F.C.R. 73, 74-75 (Austl.).
It was sufficient to permit a contracting state to return an asylum seeker to a
third country without undertaking an assessment of the substantive merits of
the claim for refugee status if it was proposed to return the asylum seeker to a
third country which has already recognised that person's status as a refugee
and had accorded that person effective protection, including a right to reside,
enter and re-enter that country.
Al-Rahal, (2001) 110 F.C.R. at 74-75.
131.
Al-Rahal, (2001) 110 F.C.R. at 96 (quoting Al-Zafiry v. Minister for Immigr.
& Multicultural Aff., (1999) F.C.A. 443, 558-59 (Austl.)); see also 8115/00A, (2001) 180
A.L.R. 561, 1 6.
Where an applicant for a protection visa in Australia is "as a matter of practical
reality and fact," likely to be given "effective protection" in a third country by
being permitted to enter and live in that country where he or she will not be at
risk of being returned to his or her original country, Australia can (consistent
with Article 33) return the applicant to that third country without considering
whether he or she is a refugee.

S115/00A, (2001) 180 A.L.R. 561,

6.
132.
See id. (stressing that an assessment of "practical reality and fact" is the
most appropriate methodology to determine the question of effective protection).
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The Australian approach provides an interesting anomaly in
considering the legality of "safe asylum country" rules under the 1951
Convention. Australia requires that a safe third country provide
effective protection to the applicant; yet, the safe third country is not
required to be a signatory of the 1951 Convention. 13 3 This implies
that states not party to the 1951 Convention can provide adequate or
above adequate protection to an asylum-seeker, even though they are
not legally required to afford the asylum-seeker all the protections
guaranteed by the 1951 Convention. 134 The Australian courts have
advocated this methodology by emphasizing that states must take a
practical look at the safe third country, realizing that parties to the
1951 Convention can just as easily violate the non-refoulement
provision as non-party states. 135 This approach seems to comply with
Article 33, pending careful scrutiny of the safe third country's
intentions, to ensure that refugees are not refouled. 136 Yet, it also
deprives applicants of any rights they would have acquired by virtue
of reaching Australian jurisdiction, since Australia, as a party to the
1951 Convention, is required to give the applicant all the
1951 Convention protections, including, but not limited to, non137
refoulement, while a non-party third state has no such obligation.
Another interesting facet of the Australian approach is that safe
third countries need not consent to granting the applicant asylum
before the sending state can transfer the refugee to the safe third
country.' 38 Australian courts have held that Article 33 does not
require Australia to ensure that a third state has consented to protect
the refugee and grant him, the right to reside within its borders before

133.
See Thiyagarajah, 199 C.L.R. at 364 (requiring that a "safe third country"
be able to provide effective protection to an asylum seeker); see also S115/00A, (2001)
180 A.L.R. 561, 6 (explaining that it is not necessary for the "safe third country" to be
party to the 1951 Convention).
134.
Al-Rahal, (2001) 110 F.C.R. at 96 (defining effective protection).
135.
Id. at 97 ("Is there a 'real chance' of persecution for a Convention reason in
country A [the safe third country]? That real chance may exist whether or not country
A is a party to the [1951] Convention.").
136.
See 1951 Convention, supra note 6, art. 33 (missing language that obligates
a State to either grant asylum to a refugee or prevent the refugee from residing in a
State not party to the 1951 Convention).
137.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 328, 331.
None of the "safe third country" rules now in place requires the destination
state to respect even the rights of all refugees as established by the [1951]
Convention itself, including for example the to freedom of internal movement,
to freedom of thought and conscience, or even to have access to the necessities
of life.
Id. For further criticism of the Australian approach, see generally Kneebone &
Pickering, supra note 129 (noting Australia's Pacific Strategy improperly aims to
achieve deterrence of asylum applicants rather than focusing on protection needs and
the right to seek asylum).
138.
Al-Rahal, (2001) 110 F.C.R. at 75-76.
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Australia may utilize safe third country procedures. 139 This view is
consistent with the interpretation that non-refoulement grants no
140
positive rights to refugees.
With the lack of settled international law on this point, it seems
that the Australian approach of securing effective protection by the
third state meets the obligations of non-refoulement, even if effective
protection does not indicate assurance that the third state will grant
asylum.' 4 ' If the third state does not grant asylum, there is no
inherent violation of non-refoulement by the sending state or the
third state-Article 33 requires only that the third state not send the
applicant to a territory where he has a genuine belief that his life or
14 2
freedom would be in jeopardy under the Convention.
The collective approach to non-refoulement creates a unique set
of complications in determining the proper implementation of Article
33. Unlike the absolute state sovereignty approach, the collective
approach makes allocating responsibility more difficult when there
are violations of non-refoulement. 143 In this context, Article 33 does
not contain sufficient language to ensure that states do not use "safe
country of asylum" procedures to circumvent their obligations of nonrefoulement. 144 On the other hand, states' use of first country of
arrival and safe third country rules to help allocate the burden of

139.

Id.

[Art. 33] does not necessarily require that a third country has already accepted
an obligation to protect the person who is an applicant for a protection visa,
with the consequence that that person has a right to reside in that country and
a right to have issued to him travel documents that permit departure from and
re-entry into that country.
Id.
140.
Critics of this position argue that without explicit consent of the third State
to grant the refugee asylum, the refugee has no guarantee of non-refoulement and
thus, the sending State is not relieved of its international obligations. Id. at 84.
States have no authorization under international law to expel persons to third
States without the consent of the third State . . . Accordingly, tacit agreement
to admit is not sufficient evidence that the third State will refrain from
refoulement and so does not relieve the returning State of its international
obligations.
Id.; see also A. Achermann & M. Gattiker, Safe Third Countries: European
Developments, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 19, 25 n.24 (1995) ("With regard to refugees who
are in the country's territory, this means that they may not be turned back or expelled
if no other State in which they are safe from persecution is obliged or willing to take
them.").
141.
See A1-Rahal, (2001) 110 F.C.R. at 84 (stating there is no settled
international law on whether consent of a third state is required).
142.
1951 Convention, supra note 6, art. 33.
143.
Compare The Absolute State Sovereignty Approach, supra Part III.A, with
The Collective Approach, supra Part III.B for clear examples of this point.
144.
This conclusion is evidenced by the fact that States have the opportunity to
choose from a variety of approaches in implementing Article 33. See supra Part III.
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accommodating influxes of refugees can be an appropriate solution to
distribute the burdens of migration while maintaining heightened
protection for refugees. 145 The collective approach, however, can also
provide a convenient tool to avoid asylum claims and international
146
obligations under the 1951 Convention.
C. The Collective Approach with a Twist
Other countries use a variation on the collective approach to nonrefoulement, utilizing procedural measures to avoid reviewing asylum
claims applications, depriving the refugee of the opportunity to
legally reside in the receiving state. 147 France, for example, has
designated portions of its territory as "transit zones"la4 8-usually
around airports through which large portions of asylum applicants
arrive. 14 9 Initially, the French government argued that national law
did not pertain to transit zones, rendering inapplicable any
guarantees provided to refugees under French domestic law and
French international obligations. 150 Subsequent reforms tailored to
the concept of the transit zone began in the late 1980s due to internal
and external political pressure. 1 1 The current conception of transit
zones gives applicants more rights, especially in terms of detention;
however, the French Constitutional Court has condoned refusal to
review asylum applications made within the transit zone in certain
152
situations.
The French Constitutional Court examined the practice within
transit zones and considered whether procedures allowing
administrative officials to deny review of asylum applications were de
facto a refusal by the government to comply with its international
obligations in territory over which it controlled. 153 The Court
recognized the legality of transit zones by noting "an alien who has
not been authorised to enter France . .. or who has appealed for
admission as an asylum-seeker may be detained in the transit

145.
See Goodwin-Gill & Newland, supra note 118, at 126 (mentioning that
burden-sharing is a potential result for first country of arrival and safe third country
rules).
146.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 322.
147.
Id. at 321.
148.
Transit zones may also be referred to as "international zones,"
"administrative zones," or "waiting zones." See, e.g., Amuur v. France, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R.
533, 541, 542 (1996) (using these terms interchangeably).
149.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 321; John Foot, The Logic of Contradiction:
Migration Control in Italy and France, 1980-93, in MIGRATION AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 132, 143-44 (Robert Miles & Dietrich Thranhardt eds., 1995).
150.
Foot, supra note 149, at 143; Judith Hippler Bello & Juliane Kokott,
InternationalDecisions:Amuur v. France, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 147, 148 (1997).
151.
Foot, supranote 149, at 143.
152.
Id. at 143-44.
153.
Id.; HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 321.
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area."15 4 Next, the Court held that administrative authorities may
make decisions regarding expulsion and repeal of orders resulting in
expulsion without requiring that those decisions be subject to judicial
review. 155 The Court's acceptance of lack of judicial review was based
on the premise that "the State is entitled to define the conditions for
entry of aliens into its territory, subject to compliance with
international agreements." 15 6
Thus, under the French scheme,
administrative authorities are given the legal power to oversee
applicants within the transit zone and decide-not entirely
unilaterally as legislative criteria do exist157-whether to proceed
with an asylum claim or to detain or deport the applicant.158
The European Court of Human Rights has heavily criticized
France's use of transit zones to avoid examining asylum
applications. 1 59 The Court addressed the fallacy that a "transit zone"
is not considered within French territory for the purposes of requiring
France to adhere to its duties under the 1951 Convention: 160 "Even
though the applicants were not in France within the meaning of the
Ordinance of 2 November 1945 ' [declaring the existence of transit
zones], holding them in the international zone of Paris-Orly Airport
made them subject to French law."'161 In addition, the Court held
that there must be sufficient safeguards in French law applicable to
asylum-seekers within the transit zone, protecting their rights under
the 1951 Convention. 162
The opinion of the Court essentially
eviscerated the distinction between a state refusing to consider the

154.
CC decision no. 92-307DC,
4, Feb. 25, 1992 (Fr.), available at http://www.
conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnellroot/bank-mmlangaisa92307dc.pdf
(quoting Act Amending Ordinance 45-2658 of 2 Nov. 1945 on the Conditions for Entry
and Residence of Aliens in France, as amended).
155.
The Court has repeatedly affirmed the legislature's decision to exclude a
provision for intervention by the judicial authority to review decisions by
administrative authorities to intercept applicants in the transit zone and detain or
expel them. CC decision no. 93-325DC,
35, Aug. 13, 1993 (Fr.), available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/rootfbank mm/anglais/a93
325dc.pdf; CC decision no. 92-307DC,
16, Feb. 25, 1992 (Fr.), available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/rootfbank-mm/anglais/a92
307dc.pdf; Bello & Kokott, supra note 150, at 148.
156.
CC decision no. 92-307DC,
8, Feb. 25, 1992 (Fr.), available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/rootbank mm/anglais/a92
307dc.pdf.
157.
See Ordinance No. 45-2658 of Oct. 19, 1945, § 31bis()-(4), Journal Officiel
de la R6publique Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Nov. 2, 1945 (stating the
criteria according to which the examination of an application of an asylum-seeker to
France may be refused).
158. Foot, supra note 149, at 144.
159.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 321.
160.
Amuur v. France, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 533, 52 (1996).
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
53 ("There must be adequate legal protection in domestic law against
arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the [1951]
Convention.").
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application of an asylum-seeker within a transit zone and a state
refusing to consider the application of an asylum-seeker clearly
16 3
within its own territory.
The practice of states creating procedural devices, such as transit
zones, to avoid determining whether an asylum-seeker is entitled to
refugee status and any subsequent protections is motivated by the
same interests as first country of arrival and safe third country
rules-the receiving state eliminates the possibility of asylum in that
state for the applicant. 164 Similarly, transit zone procedures are
justified by states in the same way that first country of arrival and
safe third country rules are: 165 the state has not violated its
obligations under Article 33 as long as the receiving state deports the
applicant in the transit zone to a third country that offers the
applicant asylum or sends the applicant to a fourth state where the
166
applicant does not fear persecution.
Notwithstanding the similar reasoning, first country of arrival
and safe third country rules enjoy better legal justification than the
creation of transit zones: the basis for deporting applicants under safe
country of asylum schemes is a legally binding bilateral or
multilateral agreement. 167 The transit zone scheme, on the other
hand, has no legal justification for declaring certain areas, which are
part of the sovereign territory of the state, as outside the jurisdiction
of domestic law. 168 In addition, there is no requirement that the
receiving state, France, have an a priori legal agreement with a third
state before deporting an applicant held within the transit zone to
that third country. 169 Rather, the transit zone scheme represents a
bolder attempt to circumvent Article 33 obligations under the 1951
Convention.170

163.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 322 (arguing that the distinction created
in the use of transit zones is legally untenable).
164.
See Foot, supra note 149, at 144 (arguing that transit zone procedures
amount to summary expulsion or explicit turning back at the frontier).
165.
For a discussion of the justification of first country of arrival and safe third
country rules, see supra Part IlI.B.
166.
But see HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 322 ("Where the refusal to process a
refugee claim results, directly or indirectly, in the refugee's removal to face the risk of
being persecuted, Art. 33 has been contravened.").
167.
For a discussion of the role of bilateral and multilateral agreements among
first country of arrival and safe third country rules, see supra Part III.B.
168.
See Amuur v. France, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 533,
52 (eviscerating any legal
distinction between the law applicable inside of and outside of the transit zone).
169.
See Foot, supra note 149, at 143-44 (noting that under the transit zone
scheme summary expulsion of asylum-seekers occurs in France without mention of any
agreement between France and the country to which asylum-seekers are being
deported).
170.
See id. at 144 (reporting the following numbers for the expulsion of asylumseekers from France: "[I]n 1986, 51,436 were turned back at France's borders, 71,063 in
1987 (an average of 195 people a day) and 37,038 in the first seven months of 1988.").

306

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42.'279

D. The Restrictive DefinitionalApproach
The restrictive definitional approach, similar to the absolute
sovereignty approach, exploits the ambiguous wording of the 1951
Convention to return certain refugees to their country of origin even
after an affirmative finding of refugee status. As explained in Part I,
Article 33 rights are only applicable to asylum-seekers classified as
refugees based on the qualifications listed in Article 1.171 States
following this approach, however, argue not all applicants classified
as refugees are eligible for non-refoulement benefits. 172 Instead,
according to a narrow textual reading of Article 33, only a subset of
refugees cannot be refouled-those whom the receiving state
determines would be returned to a place where their "life or freedom
would be threatened." 173 This distinction translates into the "legal"
refoulement of refugees if the receiving state determines there is no
threat to their life or freedom since the "well founded fear" required
for refugee status is not by itself sufficient to prove an inherent
1 74
"threat to life or freedom.'
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the restrictive definitional
approach for refugees that crossed the border in Cardoza-Fonseca.
The Court began by pointing out that "[art.] 33.1 requires that an
applicant satisfy two burdens: first, that he or she be a 'refugee,' i.e.,
prove at least a 'well-founded fear of persecution'; second, that the
'refugee' show that his or her life or freedom 'would be threatened' if
deported. ' 175
By establishing a two-prong test for Article 33
protection, the Court implicitly acknowledged that not all applicants
determined to be refugees would automatically receive nonrefoulement protection. 176 Instead, only those applicants who could
successfully demonstrate refugee status and a clear threat of
persecution, beyond the "well founded fear" required for refugee
status, would be entitled to non-refoulement. 177 Although some
applicants classified as refugees are not entitled to Article 33

171.
For a discussion of refugee status as a precondition to non-refoulement
rights, see supraPart II.A.
172.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 304 (noting that a narrow textual
analysis may lead to the conclusion that not all refugees are guaranteed Article 33
rights).
173.
Id.
174.
Id.
175.
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440-41 (1987).
176.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 307 (stating that at least some refugees,
under this approach, would be refouled to their country of origin).
177.
See Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 444 ("Out of the entire class of 'refugees,'
those who can show a clear probability of persecution are entitled to mandatory
suspension of deportation [non-refoulement] ... while those who can only show a wellfounded fear of persecution are not entitled to anything.").
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benefits, the United States approach entitles all refugees to seek
178
discretionary relief from the Attorney General.
The decision in Cardoza-Fonseca has been criticized by
commentators for interpreting Article 33 in disharmony with the
overarching framework of the 1951 Convention and reaching a result
contrary to the intentions of the drafters according to the travaux
179
preparatoires.
The travaux preparatoiresindicate that the drafters
had no intention of distinguishing between those applicants entitled
to refugee status and a sub-class of refugees entitled to nonrefoulement guarantees.' 80
The Secretariat draft of the 1951
Convention indicates that reference to Article 1 in the nonrefoulement provision was used simply to refer to the timeline
established by Article 1(2) marked by January 1, 1951. The reference
was not intended to specify more restrictive criteria than that already
set forth in Article 1.181 In addition, "the reference to 'life or freedom'
was intended to function as a shorthand for the risks that give rise to
refugee status under the terms of Art. 1."182 As a result, the travaux
preparatoires of the 1951 Convention indicate that the drafters
intended to guarantee all refugees the benefits of non-refoulement
and provide no evidence to support the argument of limited
83
coverage.'
The interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court, which is also
consistent with the absolute sovereignty approach, mobilizes a
narrow, strictly-construed conception of Article 33. The Court's
conservative interpretation, however, is juxtaposed with supporters of
the opposite extreme who suggest that Article 33 protections should
be broader than simply a risk of persecution based on convention
grounds.' 8 4 This position suggests Article 33 protections should
include threats to the life or freedom of refugees as a consequence of
persecution based on convention grounds and threats that may arise
from but are not consequences of persecution based on convention
grounds.' 8 5 In advocating for the more expansive reading of Article
33, supporters point to the humanitarian objectives of the 1951

178.
Id.
179.
See, e.g., James C. Hathaway & Anne K. Cusick, Refugee Rights Are Not
Negotiable, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 481, 486 (2000) (criticizing heavily the reasoning and
result of the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca).
180.
HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 304 n.132 (citing PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAvAUX PREPARATOIRES ANALYSED WITH A COMMENTARY BY
DR. PAUL WEIS 303, 341 (1995)).

181.
Id.
182.
Id. at 304-05.
183.
Id. at 305; see also R. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, ex parte
Sivakumaran, [1988] A.C. 958, 1001 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.D.) (stating that the
travaux preparatoiresof the 1951 Convention indicate that Article 33 was intended to
apply to all applicants classified as refugees under Article 1).
184.
Id.
185.
Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 12, at 124.

308

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL.. 42:279

Convention and the liberal interpretation that should be given to
8 6
human rights instruments to protect refugees against refoulement.i
Several states have rejected the restrictive reading of the United
States Supreme Court as well as the expansive reading of Article 33
and settled on a moderate position, affording non-refoulement
8 7
protections to all applicants successfully classified as refugees.'
Australia, for example, endorsed this moderate position in
M38/2002.188 The court, like the U.S. Supreme Court, acknowledges
the difference in language between Article 1 and Article 33; however,
the Australian court concludes that "although the definition of
'refugee' in Art 1 and the identification of persons subject to the nonrefoulement obligation in Art 33 differ, it is clear that the obligation
against non-refoulement applies to persons who are determined to be
refugees under Art . ' '189 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
references the travaux preparatoires and the lack of different
standards of proof for Article 1 and Article 33 at the national and
international level. 190 New Zealand jurisprudence also accepts this
approach, as the New Zealand Court of Appeal has concluded that
Article 33 "is usually interpreted as covering all situations where the
refugee risks any type of persecution for a Convention reason." 191
The position adopted by the Australian and New Zealand
Courts-the correct interpretation of Article 33 makes its scope
identical to Article 1-has the strongest legal justification when
examining non-refoulement in international law and the relationship
of Article 33 with the 1951 Convention as a whole. 192 The Australia
and New Zealand position places Article 33 in the larger context of
the convention structure with the overarching purpose of ensuring
that state parties guarantee refugees the rights listed in the 1951
Convention. 193 In construing Article 33 to cover a subset of refugees,
the United States position inevitably results in the denial of a basic
right mandated by the instrument-the guarantee of non-

186.
HATHAWAY, supranote 14, at 305.
187.
M38/2002 v. Minister for Immigr. & Multicultural & Indigenous Aff., (2003)
199 A.L.R. 290, 38 (Austl.).
188.
Id.
189.
Id.; see also Minister for Immigr. & Multicultural & Indigenous Aff. v.
Savvin, (2000) 98 F.C.R. 168, 140 (Austi.) (affirming the congruence between Article
1 and Article 33).
190.
M3812002, (2003) 199 A.L.R. 290, 38.
191.
Zaoui v. Attorney-General, [2005] 1 N.Z.L.R. 690, 36 (C.A.), affd, [2005] 1
N.Z.L.R. 577 (S.C.).
192.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 305-07 (arguing that the Australian and
New Zealand position most accurately describes the scope of Article 33 by construing it
as part of the larger purpose of the 1951 Convention).
193.
See generally 1951 Convention, supra note 6 (reading Articles 2-34 shows
that the overall purpose of the 1951 Convention was to give refugees certain basic
rights on the territory of state parties).
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refoulement-to many refugees. 194 Thus, a restrictive reading of the
scope of Article 33 would create an anomalous provision that allows
states to use one article to undermine another.
In addition to looking at the operation of Article 33 in terms of
the larger convention structure, the travaux preparatoires are
particularly informative for this issue. The U.S. Supreme Court is
correct to point out the difference in language between Article 1 and
Article 33 in its statutory analysis; 195 however, this distinction, once
informed by the travaux preparatoires, should not be overstated.
After it becomes clear that the interpretation championed by the U.S.
leads to a result plainly contrary to the larger goals of the
instrument, other information should be engaged to discern the true
intent behind the different phrases used for Article 1 and Article 33.
In this instance, the travaux preparatoiresprovide an accurate and
unambiguous source of supplemental information that indicates a
more restrictive reading of Article 33 is not appropriate. 196 After
considering the travaux preparatoires,reading the scope of Article 33
as identical to the scope of Article 1 does not contradict the plain
language of Article 33; instead, it elucidates a duplicitous provision of
the 1951 Convention.
The Australia and New Zealand position also enjoys more
coherent legal justification than the expansive reading of Article 33,
whereby refugees are entitled to non-refoulement protection even if
the threat to their life or freedom is a consequence of persecution
based on non-convention grounds.' 9 7 There is no provision in the
1951 Convention that reasonably leads to such an expansive reading
of Article 33.198 In fact, this interpretation stands in direct contrast
to the qualifications for refugee status under Article 1, which is
specifically limited to a well-founded fear resulting in persecution
based on convention grounds. 199
Since refugee status is a
precondition to non-refoulement, expanding the scope of Article 33
beyond that of Article 1 would cause the two provisions to operate in
disharmony.
Furthermore, complete
reliance on broader
humanitarian objectives is not sufficient to justify the expansion of
state parties' legal obligations; the position must be derived from the

194.

HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 307.

195.
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440-41 (1987).
196.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 304-05 (claiming that the travaux
preparatoiresshow that a restrictive reading of the scope of Article 33 was not the
intent of the drafters).
197.
Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 12, at 124.
198.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 306 (suggesting that this position is
based upon a reliance on sources outside of refugee law rather than on the actual
international instrument itself).
199.
1951 Convention, supra note 6, art. 1.
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1951 Convention to impose a duty of non-refoulement that covers a
20 0
broader class of applicants.
The restrictive
definitional approach demonstrates the
weaknesses of a multilateral human rights instrument: ambiguous
wording unintentionally provides a convenient method for states to
circumvent burdensome international obligations.
Unlike the
ambiguity surrounding implementation, which leads to the absolute
sovereignty approach of states, there is a much stronger argument
that the correct scope of Article 33 is reasonably discernable from the
provisions of the 1951 Convention and the travaux preparatoires.
Compellingly, a particularly restrictive or liberal reading of the scope
of Article 33 obligations simply does not make sense in terms of the
broader 1951 Convention. Moreover, the existence of ample evidence
revealing the intent of the drafters from the travaux preparatoires
presents the best legal case that Article 1 and Article 33 should cover
the same class of asylum applicants.

IV. MOVING TOWARD UNIFORMITY: FINDING CONSENSUS ON THE
OBLIGATION OF NON-REFOULEMENT

The positions described in Part III are only a small sample of the
many ways that states approach non-refoulement. 20 1 The lack of
uniformity in approach needs attention because of the profound
difference in consequences that result from one interpretation as
opposed to the other. Furthermore, varying approaches diminish the
legal force of the 1951 Convention and the rights it bestows upon
refugees. The international community should recognize the benefits
of a consistent approach to implementing Article 33 rather than the
current patchwork and contemplate the correct scope of nonrefoulement and durable solutions to asylum problems left
unanswered by the non-refoulement provision.
A. The Need for a Uniform Interpretation
As an initial matter, legal instruments cannot maintain binding
force and simultaneously tolerate the varying levels of interpretation
accorded to Article 33.
For the 1951 Convention to impose
meaningful obligations on states, those obligations must be agreed
upon and be equal among all signatories. If a multilateral treaty
permits the reinterpretation of its provisions to the extent that the
obligations it imposes become so incongruent, states may dilute the

200.
HATHAWAY, supranote 14, at 306.
201.
For an in depth discussion of the Absolute Sovereignty Approach, the
Collective Approach, and the Collective Approach with a Twist, see supra Part III.A-C.
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provisions into superficial quasi-obligations. At this point the treaty,
as a source of binding legal obligations, loses all power to constrain
state behavior. The non-refoulement provision still maintains its
force to constrain state practice even under the most restrictive
reading; yet, much of its binding force is undermined by the
inconsistency of Article 33 interpretations.
Equally important, inconsistent interpretations of Article 33
create a fundamental sense of unfairness in addition to undermining
the binding force of the treaty. The absolute sovereignty approach
understands non-refoulement to impose a more relaxed international
duty than the Canadian interpretation under the collective
Allowing states to pursue vastly different
approach. 20 2
interpretations results in the more onerous burden for some states of
providing asylum as the direct result of another state's choice of
interpretation. States cannot make asylum-seekers disappear by
denying asylum-seekers access to its borders. Instead, neighboring
states subscribing to more favorable readings of Article 33 will be
forced to shoulder the burden of accepting the refugee population.
On a practical level, the lack of uniformity in state domestic
implementation means the success of an asylum claim and the
guarantee of non-refoulement are highly dependent upon the
refugee's state of entry. 20 3 This is problematic, because refugees
rarely have any significant choice in their destination country and are
usually in dire need of aid.20 4 In addition, refugees will often falsify
documents or resort to illegal trafficking in order to make it to the
border of a state willing and able to grant asylum. 20 5 These issues,
states claim, justify more rigorous border security, often less
favorable to refugees. 20 6 More rigorous border security leads to a
cycle of states passing the asylum-seekers among themselves until
refugees finally find states with more favorable asylum policies. 20 7 In
addition, first country of arrival and safe third country rules
contribute even more ambiguity to the geographic location in which
the refugee will settle. With the constant cycle of human shuffling,

202.
See supraPart III.A-C.
To observe the variety of attitudes taken towards asylum-seekers, see
203.
supra Part III.
204.
U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S
REFUGEES 2006: HUMAN DISPLACEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 35-37 (2006),

available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/template?page=publ&src=static
sowr2006/toceng.htm.
205.
See Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees: Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection, in REFUGEE
PROTECTION
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INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 185, 207 (Erika Feller, Volker Turk, & Frances Nicholson
eds., 2003) (noting that some States will treat applications for asylum as unfounded if
they discover the use of falsified documents).
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refugees may find it hard to settle into another society and become a
contributing member, socially and economically. Refugees lack the
decision making autonomy normal citizens enjoy.
B. The Role of Durable Solutions
Taking into account the diverse interests of states and asylumseekers, durable solutions, focused on both short-term and long-term
effects, can serve as the medium to find progressive approaches to
issues surrounding refugees.
Using integrative tactics, the
international community should strive to secure a safe destination for
refugees while easing the concerns that states have in accepting
asylum- seekers. 208 Integrative tactics require that the international
community and NGOs assume a greater role in contributing time and
resources to states receiving heavy flows of refugees to relieve the
20 9
practical concerns that states have in opening the border.
Integration and cooperation in the international community is
critical, especially with respect to countries lacking resources to
accommodate refugees. 210 Contributions of resources and aid can
help alleviate the short-term strains refugees cause on a receiving
211
state.
While the international community must play a larger role in
addressing and alleviating the concerns flowing from mass
migrations, individual states can also take active steps to ensure
refugees are adequately received and protected. For many refugees,

208.
See Eur. Council on Refugees & Exiles, Asylum in the EU, Asylum
Procedures, http://www.ecre.org/topics/asylum-in eu/asylum-procedures (last visited
Dec. 23, 2008) (suggesting that EU member states can use asylum procedures in
accordance with EU standards for human rights to control migration and still offer
protection to refugees where possible).
209.
See, e.g., UNHCR, The U.N. Refugee Agency, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi.
binltexis/vtx/home (last visited Dec. 23, 2008) (describing an organization working to
address the problems facing refugees and advocate on their behalf).
210.
One pertinent example of a state requiring help to relieve the burden of the
migration of refugees is Chad. Eastern Chad received hundreds of thousands of
refugees who were fleeing the violence occurring in Darfur. Chad has scarce resources
and often citizens of Chad are not guaranteed food on a daily basis. With the influx of
refugees from Sudan, there is competition in Chad for the scarce resources that are
available. Darfur's Refugees in Chad, RED CROSS RED CRESCENT, Issue 2, 2005, at 22,
22-23, availableat http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2005-2/22-23.html.
211.
See
Refugees
International,
Return
and
Reintegration,
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/who-we-are/our-issues/return-and-reintegration
(lastvisited Jan. 19, 2009).
When conditions allow refugees and internally displaced people to go home,
donor governments and international agencies often fail to ensure that the
displaced are able to care for themselves in a secure environment. Without
adequate support, fragile communities can rapidly disintegrate and a tenuous
peace can be shattered, leading to further displacement.
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the fate of their asylum claims rests with the state official with whom
they have first contact at the border. 2 12 It is critical for refugees,
therefore, that the state provides competent, well-trained border
officials to regulate applicants at the border. These officials need a
high degree of knowledge regarding the current status of domestic
refugee law and need to be able to discern whether applicants have a
valid claim to asylum, or, at a minimum, refugee status that entitles
them to the guarantee of non-refoulement. 213 States must also
update information essential to determining asylum claims regularly
to guarantee that asylum decisions are based on current and accurate
data. 214 By utilizing these domestic measures in addition to the
resources available among the international community, states can
mobilize integrative tactics to find practical and durable solutions
rather than "quick fixes" that may lead to more detrimental and
complicated problems in the future.
Incentives that result in a more equal distribution of refugees
will also result in uniform approaches to implementing nonrefoulement and help alleviate long-term effects that influxes of
refugees have on states. 215 Finite resources force states to pursue
alternatives to housing refugees in light of the cost of opening the
border. 216 To more closely align state interest with a favorable
approach to Article 33 for refugees, convention states should attempt
to distribute the burden of asylum applicants more evenly among
capable countries. 2 17 With fewer disincentives to open their borders
to refugees, states are more likely to approach Article 33 with a
response that grants applicants a safe haven within their territory.

V. CONCLUSION

The most common response to the varying legal interpretations
of non-refoulement is to emphasize the plight of the refugee, which is

212.
See HATHAWAY, supra note 14, at 287 (pointing out that the success of
many asylum claims is based on border officials, especially in countries such as Austria
and South Africa).
See id. at 287 nn. 49-50 (giving two specific examples of countries that
213.
have refused applicants asylum due to poorly trained or informed border officials).
Id. at 287.
214.
See Goodwin-Gill & Newland, supra note 118, at 126 (noting that the
215.
collective approach, for example, is one way for States to engage in burden-sharing
with regards to refugee issues).
See generally DAVID S. NORTH, ESTIMATES OF THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF
216.
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: THE CURRENT SYSTEM AND ALTERNATIVE MODELS (1997),

(displaying
http://www.utexas.edulbj/uscir/respapers/efc-feb97.pdf
available at
different factors such as financial cost to be considered in refugee resettlement).
Geoff Leane & Barbara Van Tigerstrom, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL
217.
LAW ISSUES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC 1, 34 (Geoff Leane & Barbara von Tigerstrom eds.,
2005) (discussing the burden-sharing as "the only acceptable policy response").
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not to be understated. For asylum-seekers, a state's violation of its
non-refoulement obligations is tantamount to assured destruction. A
refugee returned to his country of origin faces as a near certainty
death or persecution. When an asylum applicant is not provided with
adequate protection of life or freedom by his country of origin, the
applicant typically has no other option but to flee to another
country-legally or illegally. The grave consequences for refugees
exemplify why the obligation of non-refoulement is so fundamental to
international refugee law.
States have equally pressing interests in refugee situations. The
preservation of state sovereignty is invoked as the theoretical appeal
to less international regulation of refugees. States often lean on the
proposition that it has always been the right of the sovereign state to
control its borders according to domestic prerogative. Following the
refugee situation created by World War II, it became apparent that
an international instrument was necessary to address the mass influx
of applicants seeking asylum. States also reference the rise in
globalization, resulting in quick and easy movement of people across
borders, as a new challenge to maintaining the integrity of territorial
borders.
Mass movements of refugees also accompany practical concerns
for states, including consumption of resources, national security
problems, and issues surrounding domestic infrastructure. Refugees
often lead to increased financial burdens on states by requiring a
redistribution of domestic resources to social welfare programs and
immigration regulation. Moreover, refugees from countries engaged
in internal combat can often raise security concerns for states. If
asylum-seekers are still engaged in hostilities in their country of
origin, the receiving country may face domestic and international
security concerns. Domestic infrastructure is strained when refugee
movements foment social or political unrest in the receiving
country.2 1 8 Many domestic populations simply do not want to open
their borders to asylum-seekers. In addition, mass movements of
refugees may strain international relationships between states,
especially if one state becomes increasingly burdened by mass
migrations.
In addition to these concerns, the international community must
also consider issues of socialization and integration of refugees into
national societies. Much time and scholarly research should be
devoted to examining solutions, such as voluntary repatriation or
cultural integration, to understand how best to accommodate refugees
and the communities to which they can contribute. Repatriation may
be a positive tool that allows for the return of refugees to their

218.
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country of origin once the conflict initially driving them out has
stabilized. Yet, it is not uncommon for states' to use repatriation
schemes to remove refugees from their territory before it is
legitimately safe to do so. 219 When repatriation is not safe or feasible,
states must seriously consider how to facilitate the integration of
refugees into national communities. These issues should not be an
afterthought for states, as unsuccessful integration of refugees into
domestic culture and lifestyles has been linked to many problems
plaguing the twenty-first century, including terrorism and economic
collapse.
Given the proper rights and opportunities, however,
refugees can also be a valuable part of the national fabric.
Non-refoulement is only applicable if there are refugees moving
across state borders. Because it is unlikely that situations leading to
the creation of asylum-seekers will cease, a collective response to
these situations provides a positive result for states and refugees
alike.
Historically, refugees were the problem of neighboring
countries, but the ease of movement in modern times has
incapacitated isolationist methods of thinking about asylum. Failure
to acknowledge conflicts that lead to the creation of mass numbers of
refugees has also resulted in severe consequences that were
previously unforeseen by states. It is clear now more than ever: the
Once the international
refugee problem is everyone's problem.
community accepts the proposition that collective action benefits all
states in the long run, states will be better able, and perhaps even
more willing, to accommodate refugees, and refugees will be more
likely to secure the guarantee of non-refoulement.
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